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A Smart-Card-Enabled Privacy Preserving
E-Prescription System
Yanjiang Yang, Xiaoxi Han, Feng Bao, and Robert H. Deng
Abstract—Within the overall context of protection of health
care information, privacy of prescription data needs special
treatment. First, the involvement of diverse parties, especially
nonmedical parties in the process of drug prescription complicates
the protection of prescription data. Second, both patients and
doctors have privacy stakes in prescription, and their privacy
should be equally protected. Third, the following facts determine
that prescription should not be processed in a truly anonymous
manner: certain involved parties conduct useful research on the
basis of aggregation of prescription data that are linkable with
respect to either the patients or the doctors; prescription data
has to be identifiable in some extreme circumstances, e.g., under
the court order for inspection and assign liability. In this paper,
we propose an e-prescription system to address issues pertaining
to the privacy protection in the process of drug prescription.
In our system, patients’ smart cards play an important role.
For one thing, the smart cards are implemented to be portable
repositories carrying up-to-date personal medical records and
insurance information, providing doctors instant data access
crucial to the process of diagnosis and prescription. For the other,
with the secret signing key being stored inside, the smart card
enables the patient to sign electronically the prescription pad,
declaring his acceptance of the prescription. To make the system
more realistic, we identify the needs for a patient to delegate his
signing capability to other people so as to protect the privacy of
information housed on his card. A strong proxy signature scheme
achieving technologically mutual agreements on the delegation is
proposed to implement the delegation functionality.
Index Terms—Anonymous, e-prescription, privacy, pseudonym,
smart card.
I. INTRODUCTION
EASY and instant access to electronically managed medicaland insurance information is now a key factor determining
the efficiency and quality of health care provision. However, the
involvement of diverse parties in the process, together with the
continuously increased mobility of patients, makes it practically
infeasible to maintain such information in an unified and glob-
ally available manner. To be more specific, i) a number of par-
ties get involved in the health care provision, such as hospitals,
clinics, general practitioners (GPs), and external business asso-
ciates including insurance companies, billing agencies, pharma-
cies, and so on, resulting in the heterogeneity of information in-
frastructures and business patterns; ii) the mobility of patients
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comes from the facts that people on frequent trips may need to
visit doctors in different cities or even countries; some patients
may need to seek appropriate medical treatment beyond local
facilities. It is clear that it is hard to achieve the goal of “data
availability at the point of care” with the current model of stati-
cally maintained information repositories. This difficulty can be
resolved by smart cards [2] containing the latest personal med-
ical and insurance information, carried by the patient themselves
[1], [3].
Drug prescription is among the health care processes that fre-
quently makes references to patients’ medical and insurance in-
formation. Before issuing a prescription, a doctor needs to in-
spect a patient’s medical records, complementing his diagnosis
process as well as checking for possible allergies and harmful
drug interactions pertaining to the patient; insurance informa-
tion is consulted to determine whether the intended drugs are
indeed covered by the patient’s health plan. It is apparent that the
introduction of smart card based portable personal information
repository would significantly simplify the process of drug pre-
scription, enabling the doctor to bypass several bureaucratic and
time-consuming procedures if otherwise retrieving information
from central databases. Moreover, the doctor would be relieved
completely from the inconvenience and annoyance caused by
the occasional blockage of network traffic.
In addition to being a data storage device, the smart card is
capable of performing some “intelligent”work. We take advan-
tage of this to entail the smart card digital signature signing
capability to sign the electronic prescription pads, declaring
the patient’s authorization to the prescription so as to collect
the prescribed medicine. This proof of authorization will be
used by the pharmacy to collect payment from the patient’s
health plan account administrated by the corresponding insur-
ance organization. Moveover, this aspect is further extended
to include the delegation of prescription signing capability
among users, which we refer to as delegated signing. Simply
speaking, delegated signing is intended for a designated person
(e.g., a relative or custodian who accepts the delegated signing
right from the patient) who uses his own smart card to sign
the prescription on behalf of the patient in collecting the
medicine. Such an extension is motivated by the observation
that, in practice, it is quite common that other people instead
of the patient himself collect the prescribed medicine on his
behalf. They may be his custodians, relatives, or friends who
accompany him to visit the doctor. Although it offers the flex-
ibility to be carried by someone else than the owner himself,
passing the smart card to a delegatee would increase the like-
lihood of disclosing sensitive personal medical information
stored in the card and expose the patient to potential threat
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of unexpected abuses. From a technical point of view, it is
obviously desirable to root out such drawbacks in an e-pre-
scription system. Delegated signing avoids the passing of a
patient’s smart card to the people who actually sign the pre-
scription pad. An additional fact that merits delegated signing
is that it does not complicate the system, instead it simpli-
fies the system design to avoid considering implementation
particulars. A typical particular is that if the smart card is
implemented as biometrics-based, then passing smart card to
others for signing would be impossible.
Apart from bringing the flexibility and convenience in
accessing personal health and insurance data, the adoption
of smart cards in our system has many other advantages: the
authenticity of the patients is automatically ensured by holding
the cards, so that many processes would be automated and
sped up, e.g., hospital admissions; it prevents patients from
obtaining multiple prescriptions from different practitioners;
smart cards can be used as a tool for tracking public health
initiatives, e.g., vaccinations; with free access to the emergency
data stored in the smart card, emergency treatment would be
instant; to name a few.
Privacy concerns in health care prevail now. Notably, pa-
tients worry about their health information being disclosed.
The medical community has long been recognizing the ethical
and professional obligation to protect health care information,
as stated in the Hippocratic oath: Whatsoever I shall see or hear
in the course of my dealing with men, if it be what should not
be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things
to be holy secrets. As a matter of fact, privacy of health infor-
mation goes beyond the ethical scope in the sense that com-
promising its privacy would harm patients’ dignity, job acqui-
sition, and health [4]–[6]. Legislation too has long recognized
the importance and urgency in maintaining privacy of health
care information. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act in U.S. [7], Recommendation R (75)
in Europe [32], and the Health Information Privacy Code in
New Zealand [39] are all laws on the protection of health
care information. As far as prescription is concerned, doctors
have privacy concerns too. In particular, doctors’ prescription
patterns would be (and have been) collected, analyzed, and
utilized by their affiliated organizations, drug companies, etc.,
[8]. For instance, the General Practice Research Database [35]
maintained in the U.K. serves, among others, exactly this pur-
pose. It is therefore crucially important to protect privacy of
both the patients and the doctors in the course of prescription.
We, in respondence, focus on addressing such privacy issues
in the proposed system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We inves-
tigate the privacy issues regarding patients as well as doctors in-
volved in the process of prescription in Section II. In Section III,
we present a strong proxy signature scheme achieving mutual
agreements between the delegator and the delegatee, to enable
the delegated signing functionality in our system. In Section IV,
we propose our protocol to implement a smart-card-based e-pre-
scription system, meeting the identified needs of privacy protec-
tion. We also outline the aspects on protecting data in the smart
card and review some works that are closely related to ours. Sec-
tion V is a summary of the paper.
II. PRIVACY IN PRESCRIPTION
Electronic medical records (EMRs) are gradually substituting
the traditional paper-based medical records in health care do-
main, providing more efficient and timely collaboration and in-
formation exchange among various health care organizations,
as well as external business associates (e.g., pharmacies, insur-
ance organizations, billing companies, etc.). Besides the direct
impact on the quality and efficiency of health care provision,
the wide use of EMRs eases medical research. For example,
researchers in health care organizations normally conduct re-
search on the basis of inspection of clinical data to find and
evaluate new treatments; insurance companies and other health
care providers frequently engage in extensive research on the
cost effectiveness of certain medical treatments and practices,
capitalizing on health care data. Although this type of research
is important and beneficial, it is a potential threat to the pri-
vacy of health care information. From the privacy perspective, it
seems enough to de-identify the EMRs prior to their statistical
processing. However, there are frequent cases in which patients
benefit from being traceable by the research, such as in the as-
sessment of treatment safety [9].
Protecting health care information goes far beyond the basic
ethical principle of respecting individuals’ privacy in a civi-
lized society. Inappropriate disclosure of an individual’s health
care information has varying consequences, ranging from in-
convenience to ruin [41] (see http://www.healthprivacy.org for
a number of concrete cases). The protection of security and pri-
vacy of the health care information is now under the jurisdiction
of laws around the world. For example, U.S. enacted the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [7], [10];
European Union issued the Recommendation R (75) [32] and
Privacy Directive [42], Japan has the Data Protection Bill [43],
and South Korea has similar Acts [44].
Privacy protection of prescription information is relevant in
the overall context of protecting health care information pri-
marily due to the fact that prescription data are quite revealing
of a patient’s health history. In other words, it is by no means
very hard to deduce one’s health condition by inspecting his pre-
scription information. In this sense, there is little difference be-
tween prescription data and other kinds of medical records in
terms of privacy concern from the viewpoint of patients. On the
other hand, doctors also have privacy concern in prescription
data since their prescription habit is reflected there. This infor-
mation can be then utilized for many purposes. Consider this
example: a hospital, based on the comparison of doctors’ pre-
scription patterns, may issue guidelines on prescription of cer-
tain drugs, and doctors are then required to follow. Those failing
to comply would be treated negatively. Another example: drug
companies take advantage of doctors’ prescription information
for marketing purpose, tempting doctors to prescribe their drugs
[8]. Patients’ information regarding their drug purchasing can be
used for a similar reason by drug companies.
The process of prescription is a little particular in the sense
that it involves external business associates such as pharmacy
and insurer other than medical related parties. The active
involvement of several parties would inevitably cause multiple
vulnerabilities in terms of privacy protection. Moreover,
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while it is reasonable to presume medical personnel would
be bound by strong ethical obligation and good professional
faith in maintaining privacy of the prescription information,
it seems baseless to assume the same for nonmedical parties
such as pharmacies and insurance companies. Worse yet, law
regulations do not suffice in stopping these organizations from
leaking prescription information while it is being used for, say,
aforementioned cost-effectiveness research. In the U.S., for
instance, there is no federal law on the protection of medical
records kept by pharmacies; on the contrary, pharmacies benefit
financially from selling prescription information: over 99% of
prescription claims are collected and processed by Pharmacy
Benefits Management Systems (PBMs) [11].
The protection of privacy should not result in a pseudony-
mous process. If prescription pads were issued in a truly
pseudonymous manner, a wide range of drug abuses could be
expected. There is already a thriving black market on prescrip-
tion medicines [12]. More importantly, laws and regulations
require pharmacies to maintain records that can be identified
for possible inspection and preventing drug interactions [13].
For example, Section 164.512(2)(d) of HIPAA states that
disclosure of protected health information including audits may
be made to health oversight agencies for authorized oversight
activities. In addition, some current beneficial research based
on prescription data would be rendered impossible once truly
pseudonymous prescription is applied. As a consequence, it is
desirable that prescription data i) achieves two-way anonymity,
i.e., normally they are sustained pseudonymous, but allowed
for feasible pseudonymity revocation [29]; ii) provides link-
ability to enable useful research on data aggregation. Note
that linkability of prescription data is also conducive to fraud
prevention of patients and doctors. To be more specific, i)
prescription information of a patient should be identifiable to
the insurer for billing purpose, pseudonymous be linkable to
the pharmacies or PBMs for enabling research and fraud pre-
vention, and pseudonymity be revocable under law provision;
ii) pseudonymity of a doctor should be similarly revocable, and
prescription from the same doctor should be pseudonymous
to the health care organization as well as the pharmacy, but
linkable to the insurer for fraud prevention.1
III. A STRONG PROXY SIGNATURE SCHEME
In Section II, we have identified the need for delegation of
prescription signing rights (delegated signing). In this section,
we propose a strong proxy signature scheme based on the
Schnorr signature scheme [25]. Its extension to other DLP-like
signature schemes is straightforward.
For ease of reference, we list below the notations to be used
in this section:
the original signer, the proxy signer, and the verifier,
respectively.
large primes with .
an element of order in .
1There may be controversies to this point. We may alternatively employ, e.g.,
a trusted third party under supervision from government agencies, to manage
the linkability part of doctors. However, this would complicate the system.
key pair of user for signing, with .
a digital signature of a message signed by a con-
ventional DLP-like signature scheme.
the verification algorithm of digital signature.
a delegation warrant.
In the proxy signature setting, the original signer (delegator)
would delegate his signing capability to the proxy signer (del-
egatee), so the proxy signer is authorized to issue proxy signa-
tures on behalf of the original signer. References [26], [27] are
among the earliest work on the idea of proxy signature, and the
concept was later systematically studied in [20] with three types
of delegations, namely, full delegation, partial delegation, and
delegation by warrant. In full delegation, the original signer
simply gives his secret signing key to the proxy signer . This
kind of delegation seems to have little practical significance as
loses complete control of his signature. In partial delegation,
a new key pair is generated from ’s secret, and the newly gen-
erated secret is delivered to via a private channel. As the
name implies, a delegation by warrant capitalizes on a policy
warrant to certify as entrusted. To satisfy the varying dele-
gation requirements, combination of the last two types of dele-
gation seems practical and viable. In fact, our scheme capitalizes
on this combination. The schemes in [20] do not offer nonrepu-
diatability since both and know the proxy signing key.
The work in [22] suffers from the same problem. To overcome
this, Zhang proposed in [23] a nonrepudiable proxy signature
scheme, which however was found not to be successful [24]. Lee
et al.[18] first introduced the concept of strong proxy signature
which represents both ’s signature and ’s signature. Nonre-
pudiatability regarding both and is thus implied in a strong
proxy signature. An earlier scheme in [21] based on the Schnorr
signature was in fact a strong proxy signature, whereas the role
asymmetry of and is not well reflected from a valid signa-
ture itself. The strong proxy scheme in [18] and its application
variant adaptable to mobile agent environment [28] offer asym-
metry in roles, but they are found subject to ’s forgery attack
[19]. Our proposed scheme is a modification of this scheme to
thwart the forgery attack by . Moreover, in our modification,
becomes designated instead of originally nondesignated for
mobile agent environments.
In summary, a strong proxy signature scheme should satisfy
the following security requirements.
Strong Unforgeability: No one else (including the
original signer) except the designated proxy signer can
generate a valid proxy signature.
Verifiability: Anyone can verify the signature based
on the publicly available parameters.
Strong Identifiability: A proxy signer’s identity can
be determined from the proxy signature it generates.
Strong Undeniability: The proxy signer cannot repu-
diate his signatures.
Prevention of Misuse: The proxy key pair should not
be used for purposes other than the designated ones.
To better understand our scheme, we first review the scheme
in [18] and the attack proposed in [19], respectively.
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The Scheme:
— Delegation:
In the delegation phase, the original signer chooses
randomly , computes and
. Then sends secretly to
the triple , , , which is in fact ’s signature
on under Schnorr’s signature scheme. accepts
the triple as long as holds.
Note that , is ’s key pair.
— Signing and Verification:
The proxy signer computes his proxy key pair ,
as
and
where , is ’s key pair. then signs a
message conforming to as using a
conventional DLP-like signature scheme. The tuple
is then a valid proxy signature.
To verify the tuple, the verifier computes
and then checks
The scheme is, however, found to suffer from the orig-
inal signer’s forgery attack, failing to satisfy the so-called
“strong unforgeability” property. The attack works as fol-
lows.
The Attack:
In the strong proxy signature scheme, a dishonest orig-
inal signer computes , thus
is a valid proxy signature signing key and
is a valid proxy signature because
We are now ready to present our strong proxy signa-
ture scheme, which works as shown in the diagram at the
bottom of the page.
In our scheme, both consents from and are demon-
strated explicitly in the scheme itself. To see this, is ac-
tually the signature from and is ’s signature. For
this reason, there is no need to include in the delegation
warrant the identities of and , as well as certain
policy stating the acceptance of the delegation by the two
sides. Recall that is a signature from on , this
is more notably a countermeasure against the above attack
than demonstrating ’s acceptance of the delegation.
Theorem 1: The proposed strong proxy signature scheme is
secure against the original signer’s forgery attack.
Proof: Intuitively, the original signer’s forgery attack to
the original scheme takes advantage of the fact that is al-
lowed to change by substituting it with . In
our scheme, however, (together with ) is signed by to
produce . Since cannot forge ’s signature, thus, it cannot
forge . This avoids the attack.
Theorem 2: The proposed strong proxy signature scheme
fullfills all the security requirements listed above.
Proof (sketch):
1) Strong Unforgeability: From Theorem 1, cannot forge
valid proxy signatures. For other people, the private proxy
signing key contains ’s private key, therefore, only
can generate valid proxy signatures.
where
where with
checks
where
accepts as long as holds
computes the private proxy signing key as
the proxy signing key held by is thus
checks
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2) Verifiability: , demonstrates the consent of on
the delegation; shows ’s acceptance of the
delegation; verifiability of the signed message is obvi-
ously based on the underlying DLP-like digital signature
scheme.
3) Strong Identifiability: The inclusion of ’s public key
in the public proxy signing key implies that is
identifiable.
4) Strong Undeniability: The proxy signer cannot repudiate
his signatures because only he can compute the private
proxy signing key used in the signature.
5) Prevention of Misuse: Expiration date of the proxy
signing key can be readily checked against the validity
of the keys held by and , from which the proxy
signing key is derived. serves practically to prevent
abuses of the proxy signing key. In the context of our
e-prescription system, proxy signing keys are intended
for the mere use of prescription signing.
An alternative method for generating proxy signing key
is simply that the proxy signer chooses a key pair as the
proxy signing key and the original signer certifies it using
his signing key by issuing a certificate, and the certificate
states the delegation policy. There exists a controversy on the
practical significance of proxy signing schemes since they do
not demonstrate convincing efficiency advantages over this
alternative method. With no exception, our proposed scheme
faces the same problem. However, one thing is clear regarding
our scheme that both the original signer and the proxy signer
are explicit from a valid proxy signature itself. This as we will
see, is quite critical to make prescription data linkable with
respect to the patients.
IV. METHOD AND SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present a detailed implementation of the
e-prescription system, wherein privacy of the patients and the
doctors are appropriately protected. In addition, we also address
the problem of how to protect data in smart cards.
A. Basic Idea
We make specific the process of a typical e-prescription ser-
vice in real world. A patient visits his doctor and on the basis
of the diagnosis, the doctor prepares a prescription pad. To this
end, the doctor normally connects to the central medical record
database to check for allergies and possible harmful drug inter-
actions or medical history concerning the patient. At the same
time, the doctor may query an information system maintained
by the patient’s insurer to determine whether certain intended
drugs are covered by the patient’s health plan. Upon comple-
tion of the drug selection, the doctor signs the pad electronically,
which would serve as evidence that the doctor vouches for the
safe use of the medicine. The prescription is then directed to
the pharmacy and added to the patient’s medical records. The
patient later goes to the pharmacy where the prescription pad
is retrieved. The pharmacy collects enough evidence in filling
the prescription to meet the requirements of law regulations.
Then the pharmacy charges the insurer (or the patient) for the
medicine upon the patient’s authorization (signed by the patient)
and delivers the medicine to the patient. The prescription pad
may then be forward to the PBMs for statistical research.
To simplify this process, we introduce the smart card into our
system. The smart card serves dual roles: one as a portable data
repository, storing personal medical records and insurance in-
formation; the other as a signature generating tool to sign elec-
tronically the prescription pad when the patient goes to the phar-
macy to collect the medicine. Yet another major characteristic of
our system lies in the introduction of delegated signing, which
allows patients to delegate their signing rights to other people.
As a result, a patient does not need to pass his smart card to an-
other party to sign prescription pads on his behalf. We leverage
on the proxy signature scheme proposed in Section III to achieve
delegated signing. To delegate his prescription signing right, the
patient (the original signer) negotiates a proxy signing key with
the intended person (the proxy signer) who stores the key in
his own smart card. Theoretically, a patient can delegate to mul-
tiple proxy signers. The accommodation of delegated signatures
makes our system efficient and practical.
Recall that a central objective of our e-prescription system
is to protect the privacy of patients and doctors in medicine
prescriptions, and such a protection should still support useful
research on the basis of data aggregation. To this end, we
adopt the following techniques. i) The patient applies for a
pseudonym from his insurer, which links the pseudonym with
the patient’s real identity. This is crucial as the insurer pays
the prescription on the absolute discretion of the patient. The
patient then engages in the prescription process in the name of
the pseudonym, thereby gaining pseudonymity. Transactions
under the same pseudonym apparently offers linkability.
Revocation of the pseudonymity can be done by the insurer
when necessary. ii) The doctor joins a group of affiliated health
care organization. Whenever the doctor issues a prescription,
the Group Manager signs a group signature in the name of
the group, so the pseudonymity of the doctor is achieved.
Given a signed pad, only the group manager is able to identify
the doctor who issued it. We assume the group manager is
independent of the health care organization in the sense that
he would not do anything in favor of the latter, e.g., help
the organization to link a specific doctor’s prescription data.
We point out that an off-the-shelf group signature scheme
seems more convenient to doctor pseudonymity. However,
virtually all existing group signature schemes are ineffective
in revocation of group members, thereby insufficient for a
dynamic group. Considering this, we let the Group Manager
sign on behalf of the doctors. The Group Manager issues each
doctor a pseudonym, which serves to hide the real identity of
the doctor. We point out that a pseudonym system [29] does not
seem quite relevant in our case, many of whose properties, e.g.,
unlinkability of the pseudonyms, are unnecessary for our use.
It may be argued that the Group Manager computing group
signatures for every doctor would become a bottleneck, af-
fecting overall performance of the system. Referring to Fig. 1,
there are two methods for the Group Manager to calculate
group signatures. In case of Fig. 1(a), a prescription is first
passed to the Group Manager for signing before reaching
the pharmacy. In case of Fig. 1(b), the doctor first delivers to
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Fig. 1. Group signature modes.
the pharmacy which later relays to the Group Manager for
signing. This actually offers the flexibility that the prescription
is signed at any point of time before the patient collects the
medicine, alleviating to some extent the situation that the Group
Manager becomes a bottleneck of our system.
We note that long-term linkable pseudonyms would risk the
patients being identified. We, therefore, accommodate the flex-
ibility to readily renew pseudonyms. In responding to this, the
signing key of a patient is rendered short term. In other words,
the signing key is certified to be valid within a short period of
time, e.g., half a year; or once the patient senses his privacy
is at risk, he is able to revoke his pseudonym and the associ-
ated signing key [in this case, the signing key is announced in
a public certificate revocation list (CRL), and then applies for
a new pseudonym and new a signing key]. The same applies to
his proxy signing keys. In our system, a proxy signing key is
derived from both sides’ signing keys, governed by the strong
proxy signature scheme in Section III. As a consequence, re-
voking either side’s signing key results in the revocation of the
proxy signing key. As a signing key is short termed and cred-
ited under the pseudonym, it is obviously insufficient to be used
to identify the patient’s real identity when needed. We then em-
ploy a long-term key, master key, to associate with the real iden-
tity of the patient. The master key is intended for authenticating
real authority of the patient beyond the prescription context. As
a result, there are three kinds of keys in a patient’s smart card,
namely, the master key (long term), the signing key (short term),
and possibly proxy signing keys (short term).
Based on the above discussions, we now formally define the
parties involved in our e-prescription system.
1) Definition of Entities:
• Patient . The patient is the entity to whom a prescrip-
tion is issued. The patient needs to provide information
pertaining to his health plan for drug prescription. To col-
lect the prescribed medicine, the patient is required to sign
the prescription pad to show his consent on the prescrip-
tion. This authorization will be recognized by the insurer
to pay the prescribed medicine.
• Doctor . The doctor is the entity that issues the
prescription. The doctor signs the prescription pad to
claim his assurance of the prescribed drugs benefiting
the patient from medical perspective. The signature can
as well be used as a nonrepudiatable evidence to assign
liability if the prescribed medicine cause disputes.
• Insurer . The insurer is the entity to provide health
benefits plan to the patient and pays for the prescription.
The insurer may engage in certain statistical research. In
our system, we designate to be responsible for detection
of fraud by the doctor. It issues pseudonyms to the patient,
certifies public signing keys, and revokes pseudonymity of
the patient when necessary.
• Proxy Signer . The proxy signer accepts del-
egated rights from the patient, signs the prescription, and
collects the medicine on the patient’s behalf.
• Pharmacy . The pharmacy is the entity to file
the prescription. In filling a prescription, the pharmacy
collects the payment from the insurer and delivers the
medicine to the patient. The pharmacy must collect suf-
ficient evidences on the sale of the medicine, including
signatures from both the doctor and the patient. The phar-
macy also engages in data aggregation for the purpose of
statistical research to better manage medicine provision.
• Group Manager . The group manager manages
privacy issues of the doctor. signs the prescription
while keeps trail of the doctor who issued a particular pre-
scription. is responsible for revoking pseudonymity
of the doctor when required.
• Certificate Authority . The certificate authority
issues public key certificates to related entities. A may
be a medical board that qualifies and certifies the doctor’s
capability in issuing prescription.
There may be other entities involved in the process of
prescription, such as law enforcement agencies overseeing
medicine prescription. However, they are not directly related
to our discussion.
Note that the introduction of group manager as a trusted
party in our system is in fact under the jurisdiction of HIPAA,
Section 164.512(f), where it is referred to as privacy officer
, together with , constitutes the trusted infrastructure of
our system.
A prescription system is said to be privacy preserving if it
satisfies the following requirements.
2) Privacy Requirements:
1) Pseudonymity. Actual identities of the patient and
the doctor are hidden by means of pseudonyms;
pseudonymity, however, can be revoked by designated
trusted entities.
2) Linkability of patients. Under the pseudonymity provi-
sion, prescriptions to the same patient are linkable to
the pharmacy .
3) Linkability of doctors. Under the pseudonymity provi-
sion, prescriptions issued by the same doctor are link-
able to the insure .
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TABLE I
NOTATIONS
4) Unlinkability of doctors. Prescriptions by the same
doctor are pseudonymous and unlinkable by the phar-
macy.
5) Least data disclosure. Unless absolutely necessary, pre-
scription data is kept confidential.
B. Proposed Protocol
In this subsection, we present our protocols and methods to
implement a smart card enabled e-prescription system. For the
ease of references, we list the notations in Table I.
We then streamline the process of our e-prescription system
with the following phases, and outline the interactions that are
best relevant for electronic processing.
1) Initialization: At this stage, each involved entity gets
itself prepared for the engagement into the prescription process,
including establishing necessary keys and obtaining corre-
sponding certificates.
applies for a personal smart card from his primary health
care organization storing initially the latest medical records, es-
tablishes his long-term master key , and gets
the corresponding certificate under his real identity. then en-
rolls in an insurer’s health plan. To do this, he establishes his
short-term signing key , contacts the insurer ,
and directs to it the public part of the signing key .
generates a random pseudonym for ,2 issues a certificate
for the signing key under the pseudonym, finalizes the health
plan with , and enters related information together with
into a private database for . Relevant insurance information
and the certificate are delivered to via a reliable channel,
e.g., registered postal mail. then negotiates with proxy signers
to delegate his prescription signing right to them and helps
them generate proxy signing keys , .
himself may be a proxy signer by accepting others’ delegation
and generates correspondingly proxy signing keys ,
that are delegated to him. Finally, public parts of the
2Alternatively, P generates himself a random pseudonym and forwards it to
I together with the signing key.
generated key materials, insurance information obtained from
are added to ’s smart card. Note that secret parts of the keys
are generated directly inside the smart card during their estab-
lishment. The above process is depicted as follows.
M1 Enroll Req
M2
Insurance Info
M3 establish
In M1, Enroll_Req is an enrollment request stating which
plan to enrol and is the public part of the prescription
signing key. Note that computes using his master key
to authenticate his real authority to . In response,
returns to the certificate under a pseudonym
for and the insurance information (Insurance_Info)
under the enrolled health plan in M2. , included in the
certificate, is the expiration date of . In order not to
be leaked, the signed insurance information is encrypted by
a random session key . In M3, exchanges information
with a proxy signer , establishing the proxy signing
key , delegated to . may also
set up for himself , by accepting delega-
tions from other people. Recall that a proxy signing key is
derived from both entities’ short-term prescription signing
keys under the strong proxy signature scheme introduced in
Section III. is the original signer and is the proxy
signer ; and are key
pairs , and , , respectively. They collectively
produce the proxy signing key , . It is
clear that , is valid only when both
and are valid.
The doctor joins a group, such as his affiliated health care
organization, where he is entailed and certified as to the capacity
of issuing prescriptions. The group manager is the actual
entity that computes digital group signatures on behalf of the
group members. issues a random pseudonym
and certifies ’s key material under his real identity.
chooses a group signing key and obtains the certificate,
from related certificate authority , for committing group sig-
natures to the prescription. chooses also a secret key
known only to himself, for symmetric encryption and a key pair
for asymmetric encryption.
2) Prescription Preparation: When the patient visits the
doctor , he presents his personal smart card and signs a
random message on the fly to , proving his successful en-
rollment in a particular health plan. The process of diagnosis
by may be complemented by the medical data stored in
the smart card. Upon completion of the diagnosis, prepares
the prescription. To do this, he makes references to the medical
data in the smart card for checking drug allergies, drug interac-
tions, and insurance information for determining whether cer-
tain intended drugs are indeed covered by ’s health benefits
plan and checking the account status under the plan.3 then
generates an electronic prescription pad including no identities
of and . Afterwards, concatenates the prescription
pad with and delivers the concatenation to the pharmacy
3To avoid leaking sensitive account information, the smart card tells only
whether the balance in the account can cover the charges
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. Note that is pseudonymous to . Finally, up-
dates ’s smart card by adding to it the particulars of current
visit and prescription.
M4
M5
In M4, computes a signature on , the current
time stamp, using his prescription signing key to show his suc-
cessful enrolment in a health plan dictated by the insurer . The
prescription is forwarded by to in M5, where and
are random session keys for to decrypt and check ,
and are transaction headers as defined in Table I, is the
prescription pad including a serial number Prescription_Id,
is intended only for , is a signature on under the real
identity of which serves to tell who issues the pre-
scription. included in M4 and M5 is used to verify .
3) Prescription Signing: The pharmacy transfers the
prescription to the group manager for signing. To mini-
mize the likelihood of leaking prescription information, it makes
sense to hide the exact prescription content from . This,
however, will not cause trouble because is in charge of
pseudonymity revocation of doctors, so he is able to keep the
scrambled message traceable; this would also prevent from
otherwise substituting certain drugs for discriminative purposes
against . Therefore, in our system, issues a unlinkable
group signature to the encrypted prescription. A cryptographic
primitive, namely, blind digital signature [30], [31] does not
meet our need here, simply because the entity (i.e., ) re-
quiring signing is not the actual originator of the message.
includes in the group signature a linkable token in an attempt for
the insurer to link doctors’ data. then returns the signed
prescription to . The process is illustrated by the following
interactions:
M6
M7
In M6, relays received in M5 to . then de-
crypts to get and . Since is a signature (under ’s
actual identity) on , verifies . From , retrieves
from his database the real identity corresponding to , and
checks against the one indicated by . In M7, returns
to the group signature on , where is a transaction
header, is a random session key, and is the symmetric
key known only to so can be opened only by
, is the ciphertext by the insurer ’s public key, thereby
openable only to , and is intended for to link doctors’ pre-
scription data. Since keeps an original copy of , he can de-
tect ’s modification of by comparing the returned signed
with the original copy. Apparently, has also no chance to
substitute drugs in the prescription.
4) Prescription Filling: To collect the medicine, the patient
or a proxy signer goes to the pharmacy , where he
signs the prescription using his own smart card. Signatures of
both and are the evidences that must be collected by
in compliance with law regulations for legal sale of medicine.
gets the electronic payment from the insurer by providing
the signed prescription information, and delivers the medicine
to or . The prescription information is then passed to
PBM for statistical research. The following interactions explain
the process:
M8
M8
M9 Prescription Id
M9 Prescription Id
M10
M11 Electronic Payment
Prescription Id
Before signing, or must verify the prescription. To
this end, submits to ’s ( ’s) smart card in M8
(M8 ), where and are the same session keys as in M5 for
decrypting included in . Note that we assume the submis-
sion channel from ’s workstation to the smart card is secure,
so and are in cleartext. Upon confirmation, or
signs the prescription in M9 or M9 . The Prescription_Id, to-
gether with obtained from , uniquely identifies a prescrip-
tion. To collect payment, forwards the signed prescription
, ’s signature , and the encrypted session keys , to
the insurer . Upon validating the prescription, pays the bill
and returns a signature to . At this point, a successful pre-
scription session is completed. , , and are a set of com-
pleted evidence of a prescription to be collected by . Note
that we have avoided the prescription to be signed in a recursive
fashion, i.e., one entity signs upon another entity’s signature.
Verifying such a recursively signed message must proceed in a
sequential manner. Instead, , , and can be verified inde-
pendently and in parallel.
C. Analysis
In this subsection, we discuss how the above protocol
meets the previously stated privacy requirements. Our proof is
informal and intended only to offer an intuitive exposition. In
fact, a formal proof would be quite involved, and would require
more elaborated definitions of the privacy requirements as well
as the cryptographic primitives relied on in the system.
Theorem 3: The proposed e-prescription system is privacy
preserving, satisfying the privacy requirements.
Proof:
1) Pseudonymity. Pseudonymity requires that actual identi-
ties of the patient and the doctor are appropriately
protected, but revocable to the designated entities. In the
system, and engage in the process of prescription
with respective pseudonyms, with the only exception in
the Initialization phase. In particular, interacts under
his real name with the insurer to apply for a pseudonym
as well as the certificate for the prescription signing key,
and to negotiate a health plan; communicates with
the group manager to acquire his pseudonym and
credentials for issuing prescriptions. Both cases, however,
are deemed reasonable considering the fact that and
are designated entities taking the responsibility for
pseudonymity revocation of and , respectively.
The real identity of is also included in messages
exchanged in M5, M6, M7, M8 (M8 ), and M10. But
notice that in all cases, only can decrypt the corre-
sponding ciphertexts to read the identity. In addition, no
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identity information of and is incorporated in the
prescription pad . With these, pseudonymity of both
patients and doctors are achieved.
Pseudonymity revocation of is clear in the sense that
given any signed prescription data under the pseudonym
, only the insurer can map to the real identity
of . As to , in M7, includes in
and , which are readable only to and thus
pseudonymous to other entities. This means, given a valid
prescription data , only can tell who exactly is-
sued the prescription.
2) Linkability of patient. This property requires that under
the pseudonymity provision, prescriptions to the same pa-
tient are linkable to the pharmacy . Linkability of
patient to follows immediately if the prescriptions to
are signed by himself in M9. If the prescriptions to
are signed by a proxy signer in M9 , according
to a property of our proposed strong proxy scheme, i.e.,
identities of both the original signer and the proxy signer
are explicit in a valid proxy signature, linkability of the
patient is also achieved.
3) Linkability of doctor. This requires that under the
pseudonymity provision, prescriptions issued by the same
doctor are linkable to the insure . Prescriptions
issued by the doctor are signed by the group manager
in M7. includes in the group signature
. Since the insurer is able to decrypt using his private
key, linkability of the doctor to is thus achieved. is a
semantically secure public key cryptosystem, by reading
without decryption, no one can do the same linking.
4) Unlinkability of doctor. This property requires that
prescriptions by the same doctor are pseudonymous
and unlinkable to the pharmacy . Pseudonymity of
the doctor to holds true as we already discussed
in the first requirement. It then suffices for us to show
that is unlinkable to . Included in are ,
, , , and : is random; and
are random dictated by random session
keys; so is ; and as we just discussed, from
no one including can do the same linking as does
by decrypting . Unlinkability of the doctor to is
thus achieved. Interestingly, and
cannot be simply replaced by , as other-
wise a portion of the ciphertext might be fixed, making
the prescriptions by linkable to . To see this,
consider the following scenario: suppose the symmetric
cipher is the widely used DES (its block size is 64 bits)
and the text length of exceeds 64 bits, then the first
block of is always a fixed value.
5) Least data disclosure. It requires that unless absolutely
necessary, prescription data be kept confidential. It would
be quite hard to precisely define and then prove the im-
plication of least data disclosure in the system. We, how-
ever, mention two outstanding facts of our system relating
to this point. First, to protect the information including the
prescription data stored in a patient’s smart card, the pa-
tient delegates his signing right to other people to avoid the
possibility of his card being carried by others. Second, to
avoid unnecessarily disclosing information while without
affecting its functionality, the group manager is de-
signed to “blindly” sign prescriptions.
D. Smart Card Aspects
Needless to say, security of the smart card is of paramount im-
portance in our system. We consider the smart card as a tamper-
resistant device that offers significant resistance to physical at-
tacks. The smart card is equipped with a crypto-coprocessor for
performing crypto-algorithms. The SLE66CX microcontroller
family from Infineon Technologies [48] and the AT90SC mi-
crocontroller family [49] from Atmel seem to be sufficient for
our use since they perform fast discrete logarithm computations
by hardware. There are normally three types of memories con-
stituting the storage system of a smart card, namely, working
memory, program memory, and user memory. Working memory
is made up of random access memory (RAM) chips, providing
temporary storage for the data exchanged during program ex-
ecution. Data in working memory will get lost when power is
off. Program memory is a kind of nonerasible read only memory
(ROM). The operating system and the security module that en-
forces security mechanisms resides in this area. The content of
program memory is entered when the chip is manufactured, and
any later attempt to modify it would ruin the card. User memory,
taking advantage of EEPROM technology, is programmable in
the sense that it can be erased and rewritten by electronic means.
All personal data used in our system including medical records,
insurance information, key materials (master key, signing key,
and proxy signing keys from other people if any) are stored in
this area.
We further organize the user memory into different sections
to accommodate data requiring different maintenance and ac-
cess control. Note that the allocation of space is theoretical, and
the precise structure and the data access control will be imple-
mented in accordance with existing standards [45]–[47]
• Secret Section
This section is designed to be written only once and
cannot be read from the outside by either physical or
logical means [17]. The data in this area are retained
throughout the life cycle of a smart card, and can only be
read by its own microprocessor. The following data are
archived in this section:
— the card manufacture’s PIN;
— the card holder’s long-term master key: The master key
serves to authenticate the patient’s actual identity, e.g.,
when the patient enrols in a health plan by interacting
with the insurer.
• Sensitive Section
This section is similar to the secret section, but allows for
occasional updates. The following information is stored
here:
— the card issuer’s PIN (CIN): The card issuer in our
system is the patient’s primary health care providing
organization. CIN serves to protect the application
data against unauthorized operations such as erase and
write;
— the card holder’s PIN (CHN): The card holder is obvi-
ously the patient himself in our system. CHN is used to
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activate certain functionalities of the smart card, e.g.,
to review the protected information.
• Working Section
This section can be erased and rewritten, whereas such
updates can be accomplished only by designated entities,
the card issuer or holder in our case. The information in
working section is read protected, write protected, or erase
protected through appropriate access control codes (CIN
or CHN), depending on the nature of the data. The fol-
lowing data are managed in this section:
— private part of the card holder’s short-term signing key:
The signing key serves to sign electronically the pre-
scription when the patient collects the medicine in the
pharmacy;
— private part of the short term proxy signing keys del-
egated to the card holder: The card holder may agree
to be the proxy signer of other people in terms of pre-
scription signing. If this is the case, the proxy signing
keys are stored in this area;
— medical information: The medical information set in-
cludes coded personal medical records, consultation
details, and prescription information;
— insurance information.
• Public Section
Data in public section can be read free, requiring no pro-
tection. The following data are stored in this area:
— serial number of the card;
— pseudonym and related personal pseudonymous infor-
mation;
— emergency medical information: such information in-
cludes blood type, drug allergies, etc.;
— public keys and their corresponding certificates: These
include the delegation warrants stating delegation
policy for the use of the proxy signing keys.
We summarize the data managed in the user memory in
Table II.
In the following, we clarify some particulars presented in the
table.
• By Reading Forbidden, the data can only be read through
the microprocessor of the smart card.
• The design of the data structure for medical record is
merely indicative instead of descriptive. In other words,
we code the medical record using a well-structured
template. As a result, most of the fields accept binary
values “YES” or “NO.” Reference [1] provides an ex-
ample of such a structured template. For example, if a
patient has “Obsessive–compulsive disorder,” the corre-
sponding field will be “ .” Similarly, all fields are filled
with either “ ” or “ .” In this way, the 40-B space allo-
cated for the patient’s medical records can accommodate
320 fields.
• We assume that discrete logarithm based public key
cryptosystems are used to compute digital signatures and
issue key certificates. This makes typically 160-b private
keys, 212-B public keys, and 84-B digital signatures. A
public key (short-term) certificate is simplified to contain
minimally the user’s name, ’s name, expiration date,
and a digital signature on them. Other certificates, such
TABLE II
DATA MANAGEMENT
as those for proxy signing keys, may contain a simplified
version of policy. With these, the length of a public key
together with its certificate is expected not to exceed
350 B.
• For the master key, as it is for long-term use, the public
key certificate should be produced in a standard format.
Because of space limitation, we do not include this certifi-
cate in the smart card, thereby not providing a verifier for
the convenience to verify a signature off-line. This, how-
ever, does not degrade the efficiency of our e-prescription
system, for the master key is used only once in the initial-
ization phase.
• The area for consultation details and prescription infor-
mation is writable under the card holder’s PIN (CHN).
With this, our system offers the flexibility that such in-
formation can be added to the smart card under the autho-
rization of the patient. This is significant when the patient
visits a doctor in other place than his primary health care
organization.
• We allow information regarding the latest 30 consultations
and 10 prescriptions being stored in the smart card. Re-
moval of this kind of information is on a “first in, first
out” basis. Because of space limitation, a card holder is
permitted to be the proxy signer of at most three people.
Therefore, maximally 1,050 (350 3) B of space is allo-
cated for proxy signing keys and their certificates.
• The total space to accommodate all the data is estimated
to be 5 kB. Therefore, a smart card with 8-kB memory
suffices for our system.
As a final note, we point out some existing health card sys-
tems for comparison with ours. The Health Smart Card in Texas
[33] serves mainly as a medical data container, and the Health
Card in France [34], besides containing health care information,
is intended more as a paying means for health services. The
Health Professional Card (HPC) [36] has been standardized on
European level as CEN prEVN 13 729 “Health Informatics—
Secure User Identification—Strong Authentication using Mi-
croprocessor Cards” [37] as well as consistently on the German
national level as the HPC Protocol [38]. HPC tends to provide
identification services with security functionalities such as dig-
ital signature and encryption.
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E. Related Work
The anonymous e-prescription system in [14] solves privacy
protection problems in the following way. The privacy of a pa-
tient is reserved by applying for a pseudonym from his insurer
and signing the prescription under the pseudonym. Linkability
is achieved also with respect to the pseudonym. Apparently, re-
vocation can be accomplished by the insurer. Anonymity of the
doctor is achieved by the doctor joining a group and then is-
suing group signatures on the prescription pads (a group sig-
nature scheme [15] is employed for static groups and an online
group signature scheme is designed for highly dynamic groups).
Special care is given to make the group signatures linkable. The
work in [16] is intended to protect doctors’ identities in the
prescription pads while at the same time allow data to be ag-
gregated for the purposes of research and statistical analysis.
The method utilized is to present prescription data in two dis-
tinct batches: one batch includes prescription information with
scrambled doctor references and the other batch contains the
scrambled doctor reference and the exact doctor information.
The identity of the doctor could then be released or kept hidden,
according to the doctor’s preference. Another work related to
ours is in [50]; it presents a clearing scheme for the Germany
health care system, addressing the privacy issues among var-
ious parties such as physician, insurers, pharmacies, etc., in the
overall context of medical processes.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have introduced a smart card enabled e-pre-
scription system with the following features distinguishing it
from the system in [14]. First, the introduction of a smart card
carrying personal health and insurance information greatly sim-
plifies the process of diagnosis and medicine prescription, while
smart card in [14] is intended only for signing purposes. Second,
pre-approval for a prescription from the insurer in [14] is no
longer deemed necessary in our case, because the doctor has
enough information in the smart card to support his prescrip-
tion, for which the patient can later get reimbursement from the
insurer. Third, we identified and accommodated the need for the
patients to delegate their prescription rights to other people, e.g.,
the custodians. This would protect the privacy of information
stored in the smart cards, making our system more acceptable in
practice. The work in [14] did not consider delegated signing. In
addition, we explicitly pointed out that the prescription signing
key of a patient to be short term, so the renewal of the patient’s
pseudonym, prescription signing key, and proxy signing keys
can be facilitated easily.
We believe that our proposed system is quite practical con-
sidering smart cards have already been deployed in some health
care systems [33], [34], [36]. Implementation of each step of our
protocol at the smart card level within a real word e-prescription
environment is our future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for
their valuable suggestion, to improve the quality of this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Lambrinoudakis and S. Gritzalis, “Managing medical and insurance
information through a smart-card-based information system,” J. Med.
Syst., vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 213–234, 2000.
[2] J. L. Zoreda and J. M. Oton, Smart Cards. Norwood, MA: Artech
House, 1994.
[3] T. S. Chan, “Integrating smart card access to web-based medical in-
formation system,” in Proc. ACM Symp. Applied Computing, 2003, pp.
246–250.
[4] D. F. Linowes and R. C. Spencer. (1997) How empolyers handle em-
ployees’ personal information. [Online]. Available: http://www.kentlaw.
edu/ilw/erepj/v1n1/lino-main.htm
[5] N. Keene, W. Hobbie, and K. Ruccione, Childhood Cancer Survivors:
A Practical Guide to Your Future: O’Reilly & Associates Inc., 2000.
[6] R. Weiss, “Ignorance undercuts gene tests’ potential,” The Washington
Post, p. A1, 2000.
[7] National Standards to Protect the Privacy of Personal Health In-
formation, Office for Civil Rights. (2001). [Online]. Available:
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/
[8] T. Albert. (2000) Doctors ask AMA to assure some privacy for their pre-
scription pads. [Online]. Available: http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/
amnews/pick_00/prl11225.htm,
[9] Food and Drugs Administration. Medwatch: The FDA Safety Infor-
mation and Adverse Event Reporting Program. [Online]. Available:
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/
[10] Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
Office for Civil Rights. (2001). [Online]. Available: http://www.hhs.
gov/ocr/hipaa/finalmaster.html
[11] Health Care Financing Administration. (2001) Study of Pharmaceu-
tical Benefit Management. [Online]. Available: http://www.hcfa.gov/
research/pharmbm.pdf
[12] J. Ledbetter. (1999) Is Buying Drugs on the Web too Easy?. [Online].
Available: http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9906/29/drugs.idg/
index.html
[13] California Board of Pharmacy, California Pharmacy Laws Sacra-
mento, CA.
[14] G. Ateniese and B. Medeiros, “Anonymous e-prescriptions,” in Proc.
ACM Workshop Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES02), 2002.
[15] G. Ateniese, J. Camenisch, M. Joye, and G. Tsudik, “A practical and
provably secure colalition-resistant group signature scheme, advances
in cryptology,” in Proc. CRYPTO’00 (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2000, vol. 1880, pp.
255–270.
[16] V. Matuás´ Jr, “Protecting doctor’s identity in drug prescription analysis,”
Health Informatics J., vol. 4, p. 4, 1998.
[17] B. Schneier and A. Shostack, “Breaking up is hard to do: Modeling secu-
rity threats for smart cards,” in Proc. USENIX Workshop on Smart Card
Technology, 1999, pp. 175–185.
[18] B. Lee, H. Kim, and K. Kim, “Strong proxy signature and its applica-
tions,” in Proc. SCIS, 2001, pp. 603–608.
[19] H. M. Sun and B. T. Hsieh, “On the security of some proxy signature
schemes,” Cryptology ePrint Archive no. 068, 2003.
[20] M. Mambo, K. Usuda, and E. Okamoto, “Proxy signature for delegating
signing operation,” in Proc. 3rd ACM Conf. Computer and Comminica-
tions Security, 1996.
[21] S. Kim, S. Park, and D. Won, “Proxy signatures, revisited,” in Proc. Int.
Conf. Information and Communication Security (Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1997, vol. 1334,
pp. 223–232.
[22] H. Pertersen and P. Horster, “Sefl-certified keys-concepts and applica-
tions,” in Proc. Communications and Multimedia Security, IFIP, 1997,
pp. 102–116.
[23] K. Zhang, “Threshold proxy signature schemes,” in Proc. Information
Security Workshop, Japan, 1997, pp. 191–197.
[24] N. Y. Lee, T. Hwang, and C. H. Wang, “On Zhang’s nonrepudiable proxy
signature schemes,” in Proc. 3rd Australasian Conf. Information Secu-
rity and Privacy, 1998, pp. 415–422.
[25] C. Schnorr, “Efficient identification and signature for smart cards,” in
Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO’89 (Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1989, vol. 435, pp. 235–251.
[26] V. Varadharajan, P. Allen, and S. Black, “An analysis of the proxy
problem in distributed systems,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. Research in
Security and Privacy, 1991, pp. 255–275.
58 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN BIOMEDICINE, VOL. 8, NO. 1, MARCH 2004
[27] B. C. Neuman, “Proxy-based authorization and accounting for dis-
tributed systems,” in Proc. 13th Int. Conf. Distributed Computing
Systems, 1993, pp. 283–291.
[28] B. Lee, H. Kim, and K. Kim, “Secure mobile agent using strong non-
designated proxy signature,” in Proc. ACISP (Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2001, vol. 2119,
pp. 474–486.
[29] A. Lysyanskaya, R. Rivest, A. Sahai, and S. Wolf, “Pseudonym sys-
tems,” in Selected Areas in Cryptography (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1999, vol. 1758.
[30] J. Camenisch, J. M. Piveteau, and M. Stadler, “Blind signatures based
on the discrete logarithm problem,” in Advances in Cryptology, EURO-
CRYPT ’94, vol. 950, LNCS, 1994, pp. 428–432.
[31] D. Pointcheval and J. Stern, “Provably secure blind signature schemes,”
in Advances in Cryptology, ASIACRYPT’96 (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1996, vol. 1163, pp.
252–265.
[32] Council of Europe, “On the Protection of Medical Data,” Recommen-
dation R(75), 1997.
[33] Council of Europe. [Online]. Available: http://www.healthsmartcard.
net/
[34] R. Neame, “Smart cardsCthe key to trustworthy health information sys-
tems,” BMJ, vol. 314, pp. 573–577, 1997.
[35] Council of Europe. [Online]. Available: http://www.gprd.com
[36] B. Blobel and P. Pharow, “Security infrastructure of an oncological net-
work using health professional cards,” in Health Cards ’97 (Series in
Health Technology and Informatics). Amsterdam, The Netherlands:
IOS Press, 1997, vol. 49, pp. 323–334.
[37] “Health Informatics-Secure User Identification-Strong Authentication
Using Microprocessor Cards (SEC-ID/CARDS),” report, CEN TC 251
prENV 13 729, 1999.
[38] (1999) The German HPC Specification for An Electronic Doctor’s
Licence, Version 0.81. HPC. [Online]. Available: http://www.hpc-
protocol.de
[39] New Zealand Privacy Commissioner, “Health Information Privacy
Code,”, 1994.
[40] European Committee for Standardization. Technical Committee for
Health Informatics. Rep. CEN/TC251. [Online]. Available: www.
centc251.org
[41] Y. J. Yang, “Security Issues in Health Care,”, Term Rep., 2003.
[42] “The European Union Privacy Directive,” report, 95/46/EC.
[43] “Bill to Protect Personal Data,”, Japan, 1999.
[44] “Act for the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public
Agencies,”, South Korea, 1994.
[45] ISO/IEC, “Information Technology-Identification Cards-Integrated Cir-
cuit(s) Cards With Contacts-Part 4:Interindustry Commands for Inter-
change,” standard, Std. ISO/IEC 7816-4, 1995.
[46] , “Information Technology-Identification Cards-Integrated Cir-
cuit(s) Cards With Contacts-Part 8 Security Related Interindustry
Commands,” standard, Std. ISO/IEC 7816-8, 1999.
[47] , “Information Technology-Identification Cards-Integrated Cir-
cuit(s) Cards With Contacts-Part 9 Additional Interindustry Commands
and Security Attributes,” standard, Std. ISO/IEC 7816-9, 2000.
[48] [Online]. Available: http://www.infineon.com/
[49] [Online]. Available: http://www.atmel.com/
[50] G. Bleumer and M. Schunter, “Privacy oriented clearing for the german
health care system,” in Personal Information Security, Engineering and
Ethics, I. R. Anderson, Ed. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp.
175–194.
Yanjiang Yang received the B.S. degree in computer
science from Nanjing University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Nanjing, China, in 1995 and the M.S.
degree in biomedical imaging from National Univer-
sity of Singapore, Singapore, in 2001.
He is now working towards the Ph.D. degree at
the School of Computing, National University of Sin-
gapore, attached to the Institute for Infocomm Re-
search, A*STAR, Singapore. His research areas in-
clude information security, biomedical imaging.
Xiaoxi Han received the B.S. degree in mathematics
and the M.S. degree in electronic engineering in 1992
and 1997, respectively. He is now working towards
the Ph.D. degree at the Laboratory of Computer Sci-
ence, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences, Beijing, China.
His research areas include information security
and smart card applications.
Feng Bao received the B.S. and M.S. degrees from
Peking University, Beijing, China, and the Ph.D. de-
gree from Gunma University, Gunma, Japan, in 1984,
1986, and 1996, respectively.
From 1990 to 1991, he was a Visiting Scholar at
the Hamburg University, Hamburg, Germany, and
from 1987 to 1993, an Assitant/Associate Professor
at the Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing. Currently he is a Lead Scientist
and the Head of the Cryptography Lab of the Institute
for Infocomm Research, Singapore. His research
areas include algorithm, automata theory, complexity, cryptography, distributed
computing, fault tolerance, and information security. He has published more
than 80 international journal/conference papers and filed 16 patents.
Robert H. Deng received the B.Eng. degree from
the National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, China, in 1981 and the M.Sc. and Ph.D.
degrees from the Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago, in 1983 and 1985, respectively.
He is currently the Principal Scientist and Man-
ager of Infocomm Security Department, Institute for
Infocomm Research, Singapore. He has 10 patents
and more than 130 technical publications in refereed
journals and conferences in the areas of error con-
trol coding, digital communications, computer net-
working, cryptographic techniques, and information security. He has served on
the advisory, technical and program committees of numerous international con-
ferences.
Dr. Deng received the Outstanding University Researcher Award from the
National University of Singapore in 1999.
